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New forms of implicit consumer collaborations in online communities and social networks influence demand 
preferences as consumers themselves increasingly participate in creating cultural products that both 
complements and competes with firm offerings. Although research findings on these issues vary, strong 
evidence from both theoretical and empirical work suggests that the increased technology affordance on the 
consumer side challenges the profitability of conventional producer strategies that are based on pushing 
product designs that serve large segments of consumers while ignoring the service of more nuanced consumer 
preferences. In this study, we present a market design in which producers create and sell original digital culture 
product and, examine the effect of consumer co-creation in the presence of consumer sharing (piracy) on 
market performance in terms of consumer and producer surplus and consumer choice. Using the methods of 
experimental economics, we find strong interaction effects between consumer sharing and co-creation, and, 
more specifically, we find that consumer sharing interacts with consumer-based co-creation and increases 
product variety and consumer surplus while reducing producer benefits from co-creation. 
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1. Introduction 
Digital co-creation has emerged as a new practice that is changing how cultural content gets made, 
used, and exchanged (Katz, 2010)1. A new generation of digital consumers increasingly samples 
and reuses parts of accessible content in an effort to customize the content to their own personal 
tastes. Many users then share this altered content with others. Such co-creation activities include 
remixes of music, video, and movies that are posted on content-sharing platforms in online 
community and social networking sites. An example of such a consumer co-creation activity is a 
personal mashup home video in which parents film their children in a private setting (e.g., a 
birthday party or a vacation trip), add commercially released music as a soundtrack, and then share 
the video with family and friends online.   
 
The traditional business model in the cultural content industries (e.g., music, film, television) is built 
around the legal principle of strong, exclusive copyrights, and it denies both professionals and amateurs 
from reusing any content without explicit permission. This approach allows content owners to earn 
“monopoly” profits that can sustain continuous innovation, to prevent free riding, and also to maintain 
control over the content (Krasilovsky, Shemel, Gross, & Feinstein, 2007). Until recently, consumers 
lacked the technical means to significantly participate in content co-creation, but contemporary digital 
technology now provides cheap and easy ways to use remix and mashup tools, which has fostered a 
massive amateurization of content co-creation, often in conflict with the current copyright regime. Most 
of the incumbents in the content industry have viewed co-creation capabilities in the hands of 
consumers as a threat; however, some business ventures offer content co-creation platforms and 
explicitly encourage users to remix provided content (Passman, 2012). The need to develop legally 
supported co-creation platforms to complement the production of creative output in the content 
industries is the key recommendation of some major legal and government policy studies (e.g., 
Broussard, 1991; Hargreaves, 2011). Hence, with this research, we help with developing market 
designs that effectively support content co-creation business models—models in which original creators 
and users of content collaborate together and produce variations and recombinations of cultural goods.  
 
Some businesses in the culture industries have already adapted to the new environment and 
incorporated elements of consumer sharing and co-creation into their business model to leverage 
collective creativity and better serve demand. For example, in music, the Grammy Award-winning 
band Nine Inch Nails (NIN) has offered new song releases in the form of multi-tracks on their website 
and has explicitly encouraged fans to remix the original content (Jarvenpaa & Lang, 2011) 2 . 
Essentially, NIN offers its original content broken down into components (multi-tracks) with a license 
for users to reuse these components and to freely remix them and post them back to the NIN 
community. Members of the NIN fan community have co-created more than 10,000 consumer 
remixes for the NIN community. Interestingly, despite its open content availability on the band’s 
website, the band’s 2008 album release, Ghosts I-IV, was still a commercial success in the traditional 
music formats: it registered as the number one bestselling album of 2008 on Amazon3.  
 
Consumer co-creation—enabled by technology change (i.e., digital content transmutability and remix 
capability) and driven by people’s desire (i.e., consumer preferences) to participate in the creative 
process of making and remaking cultural goods—is a new phenomenon that clearly has significant 
effects on businesses, consumers, and culture in general (see, e.g., von Hippel & Katz, 2002; 
Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004; Hughes & Lang, 2006; Lessig, 2008). However, what the exact 
economic effects of a more open approach to content reuse by consumers would be is less clear. In a 
preliminary study, Lang, Shang, and Vragov (2009) looked at this question by examining the 
1 Cultural content products are goods that exhibit three objectively verifiable characteristics: (1) they derive from some form of artistic 
creativity, (2) they communicate symbolic meaning, and (3) they constitute intellectual property that is protected by copyright law 
(Thornsby, 2001, p. 4). In this paper, we focus specifically on the cultural product sectors of music and movies. The dynamics of 
coding software and gaming are quite different from making music and movies and, hence, we exclude these sectors from our 
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economic effects of introducing one specific content reuse licensing arrangement in an experimental 
market environment. Their findings suggest that both consumers and producers can benefit from co-
creation in terms of surplus generated in the market. But while Lang et al. (2009) establish a link 
between co-creation and producer and consumer surplus, they ignore possible effects from consumer 
sharing (or piracy) and so potentially overestimate the benefits from co-creation. In our study, we 
address this limitation and particularly look at how consumer sharing and co-creation act together in a 
digital content market. As several industry surveys, including those of the Business Software Alliance 
and the Social Science Research Council, have reported, consumer sharing is prevalent in the media 
industries, and authors/creators have only limited control over the sharing/piracy behavior on the 
consumer side4. The piracy literature largely argues that consumer sharing results in lost sales and 
undermines the business model of the content producers (e.g., Clemons, Gu, & Lang, 2002; Rob & 
Waldvogel, 2006; Liebowitz, 2008), which raises the concern that consumer sharing could similarly 
offset the benefits that might be obtained from consumer co-creation.  
 
We specifically consider two economic shifts that have affected the markets for digital culture 
products: (1) Increased consumer adoption of co-creation activities, driven by easily available digital 
content editing and remix tools; and (2) increased sharing of digital content, whether made by 
professional or amateur creators, whether legally shared or not, and whether shared for simply 
copying or for creative reuse. Based on Landes and Posner’ (1989) formal economic analysis, we 
suggest that consumer sharing and co-creation are theoretically linked. Landes and Posner generally 
argue that copyright protection regulates access to previous works, which affects the production cost 
and the number of new works produced. In this paper, we specifically differentiate two types of access 
to previous works: the access to previous works through (legitimate) reuse licenses and the access to 
previous works through (illegitimate) consumer sharing. We explore whether and how the two types 
of access might interdependently affect the number of new works produced and consumer and 
producer surplus. 
 
We developed a simplified market design that includes producers and consumers of cultural content 
and implemented it in the laboratory. Using methods of experimental economics, we then compared 
two markets for digital culture products: one that permitted consumer co-creation through a content 
licensing arrangement and another that did not. The latter represents the traditional industry model 
based on closed content while the former offers consumers a right to non-commercially reuse content 
that they purchase 5. In addition, we consider two market environments: one in which consumer 
sharing is present and one in which it is not.   
 
With this general design in place, we are well situated to explore the following specific research 
questions:  
 
RQ1: To what extent does consumer sharing (piracy) interact with consumer co-creation 
in digital content markets? 
 
RQ2: How does this interaction, if present, affect the market in terms of product variety 
and in terms of producer and consumer surplus? 
 
We use the standard economic market performance variables of producer surplus (measuring the 
value that is created and kept by the commercial content creator), consumer surplus (measuring the 
value that the commercial content creator passes on to its customers), and product variety 
(measuring consumer choice). Hence, while the level of observation in our study is the individual 
(producer and consumer), the level of analysis is the market (the economy).  
 
We found strong interaction effects between consumer sharing and co-creation on market 
performance. Our results indicate that consumer co-creation creates surplus through increased 
4 See http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011/ and http://piracy.americanassembly.org/the-report/ 
5 Using the terminology that von Hippel (2005) and Lessig (2008) suggest, we introduce a content reuse license of this sort to 
represent a hybrid business model that combines elements of both closed (no reuse access to content) and open (free access to 
content for any purposes) business models. 
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product selection (a consumer benefit) and higher prices for core products (a producer benefit). 
Consumer sharing interacts with the effects of consumer co-creation by increasing consumer surplus 
but reducing producer profits. However, cultural goods markets can tolerate certain levels of 
consumer sharing if creative consumers focus on co-creating products in the small niches of the “long 
tail”, which represents demand that would otherwise likely go unfulfilled. Producers and consumers 
become strategic partners who need to collaborate to cost-effectively increase differentiation and also 
to contain consumer sharing. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we briefly review related literature. In Section 3, we 
develop and formally present our research model. In Sections 4 and 5, we elaborate on our 
experimental design, and, in Sections 6 and 7, we explain measurement issues and discuss our 
results. Finally, in Section 8, we discuss implications and offer some final remarks.  
2. Related Literature 
Two streams of research in particular are relevant to this study. First, the emerging interdisciplinary 
co-creation literature discusses new forms of collaboration between firms and customers, including 
producers and consumers of creative content products. Second, the literature on digital piracy 
examines consumer sharing from the legal and economic perspectives.  
2.1. Consumer Co-creation  
Zwass (2010) comprehensively reviews co-creation and identifies two types of co-creation activities: 
sponsored co-creation and autonomous co-creation. In our paper, we model an example of 
sponsored co-creation with explicit, firm-sanctioned collaboration between the original content 
producers and consumers. Co-creation has been examined from multiple perspectives in several 
fields. Many scholars argue that the practice of co-creation spurs creativity and increases the supply 
of derivative works (e.g., Landes & Posner, 1989; von Hippel & Katz, 2002; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 
2004; Jarvenpaa & Lang, 2011). 
 
Research in economics suggests that the value of co-creation is generated from access to and from 
reusing and combining knowledge and knowledge components. Modern economic growth theory 
emphasizes that aggregate knowledge accumulation at the macroeconomic level is specifically based 
on exploring new combinations of ideas (Weitzman, 1998; Aghion & Howitt, 1999). Romer (1986) 
concludes that access to knowledge created by individual firms ultimately benefits the entire economy 
because some of it, whether voluntarily or not, spills over and accumulates as generally available 
aggregate knowledge in the public domain. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) emphasize that 
technology acceleration and digitization of content has dramatically increased the potential for 
recombinant innovation. These studies suggest that access to and re-use of existing knowledge is the 
main driver for innovation and economic growth. 
 
In the software industry, software reuse has been widely adopted in practice (Sherif & Menon, 2004). 
Specifically, open source development is fundamentally based on reusing, co-creating, and 
modularizing software code (Lerner & Tirole, 2002; O’Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010). The openness of this 
process leverages the power of a community of external professionals who contribute to the further 
developing the software code. Han et al. (2012) investigate the economic value of open innovation 
alliances (OIAs) and find that the degree of openness of the OIAs is significantly associated with the 
amount of returns accruing to the partnering firms.  
 
Marketing research has long recognized consumer knowledge as an important source of firms’ R&D to 
enhance innovation and improve business performance (Gibbert, Leibold, & Probst, 2002). The practice 
of co-creating brands initially started with firms that engaged consumers with product design processes 
(Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000). Research in the innovation literature argues that, with increased co-
creation capabilities, both lead users and regular consumers are now able and willing to effectively 
participate in the design and production process of new products (von Hippel & Katz, 2002; Kristensson, 
Gustafsson, & Archer, 2004; Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008; Chen, Marsden, & Zhang, 2012).  
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But these fundamental changes in the product-design and development process also challenge the 
traditional roles of firms and consumers and present conflicts with the traditional, firm-centric 
production and development model (Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack, & von Hippel, 2002). Today’s 
consumers increasingly expect to be able to obtain highly differentiated products that come very close 
to their specific taste (Clemons, 2008). This trend is reflected in the long-tail distribution of consumer 
demand (Anderson, 2006). Leveraging user and customer creativity to increase product innovation 
and customization has been recognized as a new opportunity to lower the production cost of offering 
a highly differentiated product selection in the market (e.g., von Hippel, 2005; Arakji & Lang, 2007; 
Lessig, 2008). Open, collaborative user innovations increasingly compete with or complement 
producer innovations in many parts of the economy, including the content industries (Baldwin & von 
Hipple, 2011; Yoo, Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012). 
 
While software projects are complex, long-term efforts that entail continuous improvements and 
require the input and coordination of a fairly large and often changing group of mostly professional 
contributors, cultural content production depends much less on large teams and is most often done 
by individuals or small teams, including amateurs and hobbyists (Lessig, 2004). Hence, consumers 
with little professional subject expertise are more likely to contribute finished pieces in cultural 
domains than in the software sector (Shirky, 2008).  
 
From a legal perspective, the reuse and modification of digital content is regulated by copyright law (e.g., 
Zittrain, 2005). The goal of copyright regulation is to strike a balance between productive and 
consumptive efficiency (Landes & Posner, 2003). On the one hand, copyright protection should enable 
content creators to appropriate enough value from their works to give them incentives to continue 
creating new works in the future. On the other hand, the intent of copyright protection is also to foster 
social progress by making products easily available to society at large. Accessing content for the 
purpose of remaking it into something new and different is not just essential for co-creators of digital 
culture goods but also conceptually very different from copying content just for sharing. Although 
copyright legislation has regulated content in both situations the same way and has not clearly 
distinguished the different purposes for accessing content (Litman, 2001), recent court rulings have also 
established new case law that recognizes the appropriation and reuse of cultural content components 
for the purpose of creating transformative new content as a legitimate fair-use exception to federal 
copyright protection6. Finally, different international legal standards have emerged and different digital 
copyright laws implemented in different countries, which creates several issues regarding the production 
and distribution of co-created content products in the global economy (Stokes, 2014). 
 
To summarize, the co-creation literature recognizes the importance of consumers’ creativity, 
knowledge, and technological capabilities and argues that firms should consider exploring settings 
where users can legitimately participate in the processes of designing, developing, and producing 
products in ways that are, on balance, beneficial for both producers and consumers. 
2.2. Consumer Sharing  
Although consumers share cultural content products over the Internet both legally (e.g., user-
generated pictures, music, or videos) and illegally (e.g., digital products that use copyrighted content 
without permission from the owners), the extant research has focused mainly on the effects of illegal 
copying and distributing digital content for the purpose of simple sharing among consumers (piracy). 
However, user creativity in terms of co-creating content has been recognized as a rising phenomenon 
that, although conflicts with copyright law, is markedly different from conventional online piracy 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2004; Shirky, 2008; Hansen & Walden, 2013).   
 
 
6 In a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 24, 2013, with broad implications for the 
contemporary art world, the judges sided with the collage artist Richard Prince, who borrowed without permission several 
photographs from a portrait book by Patrick Cariou and used them prominently in his own collage paintings (Kennedy, 2013). 
Similarly, in the case of Perfect 10 v. Google, the courts held that reusing Web content (images) falls under the fair use clause if 
“accessing content [is] for the purpose of remaking it into something new and different” (Hansen & Walden, 2013, p. 9).  
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That piracy hurts sellers when consumers simply substitute legitimate with illegitimate copies of 
content products is widely accepted. For example, Clemons et al. (2002) analyze the music industry 
that supports the claim that large-scale consumer piracy destroys producers’ profits and threatens the 
entire industry in the long run. Studying a large sample of college students, Rob and Waldvogel 
(2006) found that piracy reduces consumer expenditure on music while increasing consumer welfare 
(in the short term). Liebowitz (2008) presents evidence that file-sharing is indeed the principle reason 
for the decline of the music industry.   
 
Also recognized, meanwhile, is that piracy can benefit sellers through increased product exposure, 
which can enhance brand and reputation and may generate new sales later on. Bakos, Brynjolfson, & 
Lichtman (1999) found that small-scale sharing of digital content in small social communities could 
actually increase seller profits. Liebowitz (1985) argues that unauthorized copying of content products 
does not necessarily harm producers as long as they can offset lost direct sales with higher prices for 
legitimate purchasers. 
 
In general, measuring the effect of copying is complex and imprecise, and the net effect of piracy 
remains inconclusive. For example, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) report an econometric study 
that looked at the effect of illegitimate music downloads and CD sales. The authors could not 
establish a causal link between online piracy and sales. Lahiri and Dey (2013) find that, in certain 
situations, lower piracy enforcement increases the monopolist's incentive to invest in quality, which 
contradicts the common thinking that piracy results in lower incentives to invest in innovation and 
product quality. 
 
Investigating piracy’s effect on markets, some researchers have proposed recommendations for 
digital product providers on how best to address piracy. For example, Khouja and Park (2008) look at 
the effect of piracy on pricing strategies and find that lowering consumer prices can increase 
legitimate sales. On a macro-level, Chen and Png (2003) examine copyright enforcement regulation 
and suggest that the optimal government policy in terms of social welfare combines a tax levy on 
copying media, a detection mechanism that fines copyright infringers, and subsidies on legitimate 
content purchases. Other researchers suggest sampling strategies, protection strategies, versioning 
strategies, and provision strategies for producers to mitigate the loss from piracy (see, e.g. Chellappa 
& Shivendu, 2005; Johar, Kumar, & Mookerjee, 2012)  
 
Lastly, behavioral researchers have observed that consumers tend to share their own creations quite 
freely with the public and with commercial entities (e.g., Wasko & Faraj, 2005; Xia, Huang, Duan, & 
Whinston, 2012) and do not necessarily expect to get tangible rewards from their contributions (Allen, 
1983; Boyle, 2008).  
 
To summarize, except for the positive effects from additional product exposure, research in piracy 
emphasizes the negative effects of consumer sharing on content providers.   
3. Research Model and Theoretical Relationships 
3.1. Methodological Issues 
Because our study has strong elements of design science in that we propose and evaluate a market 
design for digital content products, we largely adhere to the design theoretical approach (March & 
Smith, 1995; Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004; Gregor, 2006; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & 
Chatterjee, 2007; Goes, 2013). Thus, we use theoretical concepts and findings from the literature to 
guide our discussion of theoretical relationships among the variables of interest that structure our 
market design (i.e., co-creation and piracy and how the two might interact and effect market 
performance), but we refrain from making strong theoretical predictions and from proposing 
hypotheses that are deeply grounded in theory.  
 
What co-creation does to a market is fairly well understood, and what piracy (sharing) does is very 
well understood, but what is not so clear is how the two might interact. We draw on theory to 
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discuss the main effects of co-creation and piracy on market performance. Because these main 
effects (in isolation) are already well established in the literature, we do not formally state or test 
any hypotheses about them.  
 
The real focus of the study, of course, is looking at the interaction effects. However, no solid theory is 
available that would allow us to theoretically predict how these interaction effects, assuming they are 
present, will play out specifically on our three dependent variables. Therefore, we merely present 
plausible working hypotheses, which are more akin to open research questions than theoretical 
predictions, to indicate that the outcome is exploratory and could very well go either way. According to 
Oppenheimer and Puttman (1958), working hypotheses are useful as a starting point in designing an 
empirical research exploration and can lead to valuable theoretical or practical insights. Thus, this 
approach is appropriate given the limited state of knowledge about interactions between consumer 
co-creation and sharing, and it is consistent with the design theoretical research method.  
3.2. Research Model 
The co-creation literature theorizes consumers’ digital technology capabilities and views consumer 
participation in the co-creation process as a stimulus for content innovation. However, co-creation 
processes involving organizations and consumers are exposed to market environmental factors and 
cannot be strictly regulated by a “governance layer” through contracts and economic safeguards 
(Grover & Kohli, 2012). Consumer sharing is a key environmental factor in digital markets and needs 
to be included when examining the effect of consumer co-creation on market performance. However, 
previous research has largely ignored the potentially critical interaction between consumer co-
creation and consumer sharing. We present our exploratory research model in Figure 1. To the extent 
possible, we use theoretical arguments to discuss interaction effects on three dependent variables: 





Figure 1. Research Model 
3.3. Theoretical Relationships 
We consider three effects of interest: (1) the co-creation effect, (2) the consumer sharing effect, and 
(3) the interaction effects that can occur when both necessary conditions (i.e., the simultaneous 
presence of co-creation and sharing) are fulfilled. Again, because the two main effects have already 
been clearly established in the literature, we focus on exploring four possible interaction effects, which 
the extant literature has not theorized.  
3.3.1. The General Interaction Effect of Consumer Sharing and Co-Creation 
The (main) effect of co-creation on content markets has been discussed from multiple perspectives in 
different fields. Culture theory (Jenkins, 2006) asserts that technology-based user co-creation 
increases the overall variety of cultural products available to consumers. Innovation theory (von 
Hippel, 2005) similarly suggests that user co-creation increases content innovation. Growth theory in 
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economics predicts that economic mechanisms that support the recombination of knowledge lead to 
more innovation and more product variety while also driving economic growth and, thus, benefitting 
both producers and consumers (Romer, 1986; Weitzman, 1998; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). At the 
same time, Lessig (2008) specifically argues that sound (hybrid) business models depend on reuse 
licenses that grant some access to content for noncommercial reuse purposes while prohibiting free 
sharing. Although the specific design of such reuse licenses might vary, Lessig emphasizes that 
permitting legal consumer co-creation activities without endorsing unrestricted consumer sharing is 
key. Offering consumers a co-creation option gives them more flexibility in getting content and should 
result in consumer benefits.  
 
The (main) effect of consumer sharing (piracy) on digital content markets has been widely studied 
both in economics and in information systems with consistent results. Aside from some mitigating 
benefits, such as increased product exposure, the literature finds that consumer sharing has strong 
negative effects for businesses. Producers are hurt when consumers substitute illegitimately obtained 
content for legitimately obtained content, which results in lost sales and reduced profits (Rob & 
Waldvogel, 2006; Liebovitz, 2008). In the short term, consumer sharing does not affect product 
variety offered in the market, although content sharing platforms can make finding and obtaining 
obscure content products easier for consumers. Consumers benefit from sharing because it lets them 
acquire free copies of valuable content. In the long term, however, consumer sharing presents a 
strong disincentive for producers to invest in innovating new content and, thus, reduces product 
variety (Clemons et al., 2002).  
 
In terms of the interdependencies between consumer sharing and co-creation, the literature is 
underdeveloped. However, in an early work on culture economics that predates the digital age, 
Landes and Posner (1989) present a theoretical argument that links the two. They theorize cultural 
content production as a creative process in which new works are necessarily built on previous ones—
that is, in which creators are to some degree reusing previous works when they make new ones. 
Thus, they argue, barriers to accessing previous content, both in terms of legal and technical 
restrictions, present a cost for acquiring needed input to produce new works, and the higher the cost 
is, the less reuse will occur and the more the creative choices for the artist are limited. Based on their 
theory, we differentiate consumer co-creation and consumer sharing as two barriers of access to 
previous works and posit, in accordance with Landes and Posner (1989), that they interactively affect 
market performance. On the one hand, (the level of) co-creation presents a barrier to accessing 
previous content in terms of the rules and restrictions (as specified in a reuse license arrangement) 
on how consumers are permitted to reuse and recombine previous works. On the other hand, (the 
level of) consumer sharing is a barrier that determines the access to previous content pieces in terms 
of using them as inputs to the co-creation process. Hence, we argue that the linking of consumer co-
creation and consumer sharing is theoretically plausible, and we explore the possible presence of the 
following general interaction effect as our first working hypothesis (WH). 
 
WH1: (Consumer sharing and co-creation interaction effect): consumer sharing and 
consumer co-creation have an interaction effect on product variety and on 
consumer and producer surplus. 
 
In Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, we discuss possible interaction effects specific to each of our three 
dependent variables individually. 
3.3.2. The Interaction Effect on Product Variety 
As a way to access previous content, consumer sharing reduces the cost of co-creation because 
consumers can substitute purchasing the inputs for co-creation with (illegitimately) sharing freely 
obtained copies. Reducing the cost of co-creation should result in increasing co-creation activities 
and co-creation outputs (Landes & Posner, 1989). Hence, we should expect a positive main effect 
from consumer sharing on product variety. 
 
Allowing consumers to make products themselves by recombining components obtained in the 
market enables them to create products that currently are not offered by producers or are not 
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offered at affordable prices (e.g., Lessig, 2008). Hence, we can expect a positive main effect of co-
creation on product variety.  
 
In addition, according to recombinant growth theory (Romer, 1986; Weitzman, 1998), the spillover of 
digital contents, which occurs as consumers share content purchased from producers among 
themselves, should result in the increase of inputs (components) to consumer co-creation and, thus, 
more outputs (products co-created by consumers). Therefore, product variety could increase more 
with consumer co-creation when there is also consumer sharing. Thus, we consider the following 
possible interaction effect. 
 
WH2: (Product variety interaction effect): when consumer sharing is present, the effect 
of co-creation on product variety should be stronger than when consumer sharing 
is not present. 
3.3.3. The Interaction Effect on Economic Surplus  
The emerging literature on co-creation (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; Lessig, 2008) suggests that 
an economy that permits consumers to engage in co-creation activities could outperform the 
traditional economy (based on closed business models) in terms of social welfare (i.e., producer 
surplus plus consumer surplus). Lang et al. (2009) support this claim with an experimental study. On 
the producer side, the co-creation literature suggests that a co-creation economy benefits producers 
indirectly by reducing uncertainty about customer preferences through sales of co-creation tools or by 
allowing them to charge higher prices (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; Lessig, 2008; Lang et al., 
2009). However, these positive effects could be offset when consumer sharing is present. For 
consumers, co-creation should allow them to obtain additional products that were not available or not 
affordable in the market without co-creation because they can make the products themselves through 
recombination. They might also replace some previously bought products with more cheaply self-
made ones. This opportunity could result in co-creation’s having mixed effects on producer surplus. 
Giving consumers the option to co-create products themselves, in addition to buying them in the 
market, should result in consumer benefits in terms of consumer surplus.  
 
Consumer sharing generally reduces sales (Clemons et al., 2002; Liebowitz, 2008). In the presence 
of consumer sharing, consumers substitute illegitimate copies for legitimate products and, thereby, 
reduce their costs of co-creation. However, this kind of free or uncompensated “spillover” of content 
that producers develop also reduces the producers’ return on investment (von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003). Although consumers might enjoy higher surplus from consumer sharing, producers face 
compromised benefits. Hence, we should expect a positive main effect of consumer sharing on 
consumer surplus and a negative main effect of consumer sharing on producer surplus.  
 
The interaction effects, however, are more complex, and the literature offers little guidance on how 
consumer sharing and co-creation interact specifically on producer and consumer surplus. To 
illustrate the issue, we add a simple example of a hypothetical buyer, John. Suppose he purchases 
just one item in the presence of neither co-creation nor sharing. With co-creation, John might 
purchase an additional item because he could reuse components and then make a third 
item. However, John might purchase zero in the presence of sharing because he can get one for 
free. Thus, he purchases one in the absence of co-creation and two when co-creation is an option. 
Finally, why might John purchase zero or two items if both co-creation and sharing are in 
effect? Available theory does not help us answer this question. Maybe the co-creation creates more 
variety and the sharing then creates a larger variety of items that could potentially be acquired or 
accessed for free. That is, both original manufacturer items and the newly co-created items could be 
found in the sharing market. Thus, the probability of finding all of the components one needs in the 
free market increases exponentially, and the value of buying goes down dramatically. However, the 
secondary market also might make the value of OEM items go up as the number of combinations for 
potential co-creation increases.  
 
Hence, we explore the following two possible interaction effects regarding consumer and producer 
surplus. 
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WH3a: (Consumer surplus interaction effect): when consumer sharing is present, the 
effect of co-creation on consumer surplus should be stronger than when 
consumer sharing is not present. 
 
WH3b: (Producer surplus interaction effect): when consumer sharing is present, the 
effect of co-creation on producer surplus should be weaker than when 
consumer sharing is not present. 
4. Research Method 
Some of the most significant discoveries and useful insights in market design and behavior have 
emerged from the experimental economics field (Bergstrom, 2003).  A growing number of IS scholars 
have also used experimental economics for testing theory, evaluating market designs, and conducting 
exploratory research (e.g., Clemons & Weber, 1996; Marsden & Tung, 1999; Bapna, Goes, & Gupta, 
2001; Marsden, Pakath, & Wibowo, 2002; Hinz & Spann, 2008; Vragov, Shang, & Lang, 2010; 
Scheffel, Pikovsky, Bichler, & Guler, 2011; Adomavicius, Curley, Gupta, & Sanyal, 2013; Pelaez, Yu, & 
Lang, 2013). In particular, Kauffman and Wood (2008) and Bichler, Gupta, and Ketter (2010) 
recognize and discuss the need for experimental economics in e-commerce research. Economic 
experiments directly observe actual decisions made by human subjects in an artificial economic 
setting in the laboratory. Based on induced value theory (Smith, 1976), researchers can induce 
rational economic behavior by paying subjects according to their economic performance in the 
experiment. According to Smith (2002), laboratory market experiments are particularly useful and 
necessary for the following fundamental reasons: 
 
• Outside the laboratory, reliable data about market environment variables, such as real 
costs and values, are often unavailable.  
 
• One needs fewer auxiliary hypotheses to interpret laboratory data than is needed for the 
messy data from naturally occurring phenomena.  
 
• All auxiliary hypotheses are also directly testable in the laboratory because the 
experimenter has control over variables and causality.  
 
• The laboratory allows a controlled comparison of alternative possibilities that have not 
been encountered in reality or used in the recorded past.  
 
• Current theoretical models are too simple and based largely on constructivist rationality, 
which cannot account for human behavior stemming from ecological rationality7. 
 
Using the methods of experimental economics is suitable for our market design evaluation because 
all five of these principles apply. In online markets, both individual preferences and costs related to 
the value of time are private and unobservable. Thus, and in accordance with Plott and Smith 
(2008), we conclude that experimental laboratory research is likely to produce new insights that 
have both theoretical implications and practical implications for designing and implementing 
electronic market designs.  
5. Experimental Design 
In this study, we compare four (electronic) market designs on the basis of their economic 
performance in terms of surplus and consumer choice. The principle difference between the market 
designs was the availability of a consumer co-creation capability and the presence of consumer 
7 Constructivist models of rationality use many evidently unrealistic assumptions about the way humans make decisions. Ecological 
models of rationality try to incorporate imperfect decision making strategies that humans actually use in decision making models. 
For more detail, see Smith (2003).  
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sharing. Thus, we developed a market design model that we implemented and experimentally 
evaluated in the laboratory8.  
 
Any of the main effects that we identified as a result of the study clearly are contingent on our 
particular market design. For example, co-creation is better or worse depending on how many 
products are available in the market and what the demand for these products are. The effect of 
sharing depends on the level of sharing. We deliberately chose specific parameters to model supply 
and demand and the level of consumer sharing, included a specific kind of co-creation activity, and 
chose other design model specifications. However, the negative or positive character of the 
interaction effect is likely to be the same because we did not directly manipulate these factors. These 
positive and negative effects happen instead in the subjects’ minds as they make tradeoffs and set 
the bid and ask prices. 
5.1. Designing the Experimental Market 
To examine a simplified experimental economy in the laboratory, we had to capture the essence of 
co-creation content markets (i.e., component-based content products, consumer co-creation 
capabilities, consumer sharing, product and user heterogeneity) while removing complexities that are 
present in real-world markets but are not directly linked to our specific research question. Thus, we 
had to sufficiently abstract co-creation capabilities of consumers (to control for individual subject 
attributes such as media and technology skills, cultural creativity, and task efficiency) and to limit the 
cognitive complexity of the experimental tasks so that participants could complete the tasks in a 
suitable timeframe. Finally, we had to make sure that we retained the salient features of co-creation in 
our experimental market design (i.e., the reuse potential of product components for co-creating new 
products). To establish some degree of external validity for the experiment, we presented our market 
design to music executives at an industry conference9 and, based on the received feedback, refined 
our design. Overall, these practitioners found our design consistent with their own experience.  
 
Following standard market design principles employed in the experimental economics literature (e.g., 
Smith, 1976; Durlauf & Blum, 2009), we designed the supply structure (production costs), demand 
structure (product valuations), and the rules of exchange (auction mechanism) of our experimental 
economy. Ten consumers and four producers trade in 16 digital content products in our design model, 
which researchers consider to be sufficient to simulate a robust market in the laboratory (Smith, 2003). 
Each producer and consumer works with incomplete market information. Producers are given private 
information about their production costs, and consumers have private information about their product 
demand and valuations. The bid and ask prices posted on the trading platform are public information. 
We modeled digital culture products in a stylized manner and focus primarily on capturing the four key 
properties that enable the emergence of co-creation markets: (1) component-based design, (2) 
consumer co-creation activities (e.g., remix or mashup capabilities), (3) heterogeneous consumer 
demand preferences, and (4) heterogeneous production cost.  
5.2. Designing Component-Based Products and Consumer Co-Creation 
Each product in our simplified experimental economy comprised three components. We automated 
the consumer co-creation tools we used in the experiment with software and included a decision aid 
that helped users with identifying co-creation possibilities and processing steps.  
 
Take the product “sit”, for example. It comprises the three components “s”, “i”, and “t”. Similarly, the 
product “bad” comprises the components “b”, “a”, and “d”. Now assume a consumer has already 
8 Market design experiments differ from theory testing experiments in two important ways. While the purpose of the latter is to test 
predictions that are derived directly from a formal (economic) theory, the former uses the laboratory as a testing ground for 
examining the performance properties of new forms of exchange (Smith, 1994, p. 115). Market design experiments compare 
market configurations that differ in one (or more) critical variable(s) (e.g., modeling an important environmental condition, such as 
consumer sharing, or introducing a new technology-based capability made available to market participants, such as consumer co-
creation). The proposed market design changes should be theoretically motivated (if relevant theory is available), or they can be 
exploratory (e.g., to test effects of newly available technology or technology-based user capabilities). 
9 Music Business and Web 2.0 Workshop, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, April 25, 2008. 
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bought these two products but needs “bat”, too. The consumer has the choice either to buy it in the 
marketplace or to reuse components from the other two products. In this case, the buyer could 
disassemble the first two products purchased and then recombine component “t” from “sit” with 
components “b” and “a” from “bad” and make “bat” herself.  
5.3. Designing Consumer Demand 
For digital culture goods, in particular, the demand is likely to be more variable than for other 
consumer goods because their value to individuals highly depends on symbolic meanings they 
communicate (Choi, Stahl, & Whinston, 1997; Thornsby, 2001). In accordance with Bapna, Goes, 
Gupta, and Jin (2004), we explicitly model user heterogeneity by allowing different valuations (and, 
thus, willingness to pay) across consumers and products. On the demand side, we assume a set of 
consumers with heterogeneous preferences (i.e., they prefer different products and have different 
willingness-to-pay values for the same products) for the 16 products that one can produce in our 
experimental economy. This degree of heterogeneity is sufficient to approximate a long-tail 





Figure 2. The Design of the Demand and Cost Schedule 
 
Importantly, we distinguished between mainstream products (i.e., the head products, the three most 
popular products, which in our case are “sit”, “boa”, and “end”) and non-mainstream products (i.e., the 
tail products, the other 13 products, which include three midrange and ten niche products). Although 
the niche products were the least popular and least profitable, the sum of the demand for them could 
match the total demand for mainstream products. This conforms to Anderson’s claim that, although 
the sale volume of a single niche demand is low, the volume of all niche demands can collectively 
make up a market share that rivals the bestsellers (Anderson, 2006). As induced value theory 
prescribes (Smith, 1976), we assigned values, randomly drawn from a uniform distribution, to each 
buyer for each product to construct specific demand curves for our experiment. For the interested 
reader, we include some example consumer demand curves for individual products in Appendix A in 
Figure A-1. Unlike most theoretical work, this modeling choice assumes neither linear demand curves 
nor homogenous valuations and is, therefore, more realistic. 
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5.4. Designing the Supply Side 
On the supply side, a set of producers has the capacity to produce a predefined set of component-
based digital products. Each product had a unique, fixed production cost (indicated in Figure 2) that 
we drew randomly from a uniform distribution, and that cost is incurred when the first copy of the 
product is made. The detailed production cost schedule is shown in Table A-1 in Appendix A. Four 
different producers each controlled the production of four different products. Production costs varied 
considerably across products. Marginal costs were negligible and generally are assumed to be zero, 
and supply quantity had no constraints. The producers owned the exclusive copyright of the content 
they produced.  
5.5. Designing the Trading Institution 
The economy’s trading institution was a version of the continuous double auction. Most digital content 
products in real markets are offered at posted prices. However, previous experimental studies have 
shown that markets with posted prices converge very slowly to competitive equilibrium. Because our 
experimental sessions had a very limited timeframe, we followed common research practice and 
chose a double auction mechanism to speed up convergence (Coursey & Smith, 1983). Producers 
could either submit ask prices or accept bids. They could lower ask prices, but they were not allowed 
to increase them. Consumers could submit bids or accept the asking price. Similarly, they could 
change bids but not decrease them. These trading rules are widely used in experimental economics 
to speed up the convergence of market prices to equilibrium levels. They are identical, in particular, to 
those used by Smith (1962) in his classical market experiments. Bids and asks at the same price 
were matched automatically by the trading system. This market institution allowed producers to sell 
the same product at different prices to different consumers. 
5.6. Designing the Experimental Treatments  
With the principle market design in place, we implemented a full 2x2 design with two levels of 
consumer co-creation and two levels of consumer sharing (see Table 1) to explore our working 
hypotheses in Section 3. We ran each of our four experimental treatments four times, and each of 
these four sessions included ten rounds (i.e., a total of 40 observations per treatment). The first 
treatment implemented the traditional cultural content production model (neither co-creation nor 
sharing) and served as the baseline to evaluate the performance generated by introducing a reuse 
license to enable consumer co-creation. As with co-creation, we modeled consumer sharing by 
differentiating between two levels of consumer sharing (i.e., present and absent), which yielded a total 
of four treatments.  
 








4 sessions; 40 observations 
CnSy treatment 
4 sessions; 40 observations 
Yes 
CySn treatment 
4 sessions; 40 observations 
CySy treatment 
4 sessions; 40 observations 
 
The CnSn (no co-creation/no sharing) treatment represents our baseline and the currently 
predominant market practice (closed business model) in the cultural goods industry. On the supply 
side, producers of content are essentially licensed monopolies in the content markets. They pursue 
strong copyright enforcement in the markets and do not allow consumers to share or modify their 
products.  
 
The CnSy (no co-creation/sharing) treatment represents the same production practice as in the 
baseline except that it includes consumer sharing. Half of consumers who buy a legitimate product in 
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this treatment automatically share it and allow anyone in the community who wants it to get a free 
copy10. Producers are aware of the sharing practice. 
 
The CySn (co-creation/no sharing) treatment represents a hybrid business model in which content 
producers open up content to consumer co-creation in the post-purchase environment by including a 
content reuse license with the sold content products. Consumers now acquire reuse rights as part of 
their user license when they buy a product. They have complete access to the digital content, which 
gives them the freedom to remix the content they bought. Remix is accomplished by recombining 
individual components that are sampled from the purchased content products11. This ability creates 
opportunities for consumers to make new products that either are not offered in the market or are too 
expensive for them to buy directly. Given the availability of low-cost digital editing and remix tools, we 
assumed the direct co-creation costs to be zero. However, note that only the recombinations that 
yielded products the consumer needs (according to the specified demand schedule) accrued value to 
the consumer. In this treatment, there is no consumer sharing.  
 
The CySy (co-creation/sharing) treatment represents the same production practice as in the co-
creation/no sharing treatment except that it includes consumer sharing, and this sharing is the same 
as in the no co-creation/sharing treatment. Because consumers have complete access to the digital 
content, they can make new products either from the products they buy themselves or from the 
products that are shared by others. This treatment changes the nature of competition in the market. 
Producers have monopoly power only over the final products but not over the components that are 
embedded in them. Thus, consumers can source a component from different producers offering 
products that include the same components. Although no direct competition exists on final products, 
producers now compete indirectly on components that are not sold individually. 
5.7. Designing the Experimental Tasks 
Figure 3 depicts a flowchart that describes the experimental process and shows the tasks and 
decision points for the subjects in the experiment.  
 
At the beginning of each round, producers received their private information, their production 
schedule, and the associated fixed costs (as detailed in Table A-1 in Appendix A) for making the four 
products for which they owned the rights. They knew neither the other producers’ production 
schedules nor any consumer demand schedules. Throughout the round, they monitored the market 
and check the bids that consumers who were interested in their products were posting. Taking into 
account market signals about consumer demand and the known production cost, producers decided 
whether and when to produce a product and offer it in the market. Producers might have decided to 
offer only those products on which they expected to make money. 
 
Considerable uncertainty remained about the profitability of the different products because of 
incomplete market information and the high fixed cost that a decision to develop a new product 
entailed. Once producers chose to offer a product, they needed to set an ask price. During the course 







10 The presence of consumer sharing resembles the current level of piracy in the content markets. Based on available data 
estimates and industry reports (i.e., 9th Annual BSA Global Software 2011 Piracy Study (http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011/) and 
Media Piracy in Emerging Economies (Social Science Research Council, March 2011, 
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/the-report/)), we set the level at 50 percent. However, note that consumer sharing/piracy 
at the industry level is difficult to measure and varies somewhat across content categories. From an experimental design 
perspective, the exact percentage is less important than the qualitative distinction. 
11 To experimentally control for different remix skills, we provided subjects with a remix tool that largely automates the remixing 
process given the specific content products available to the consumer in the market and the consumer’s demand schedule.  
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Note: the boxes with a dashed border highlights the difference between the treatments. 
Figure 2. Buyer and Seller Tasks 
 
In addition to the four producers, ten consumers participated. Each consumer had a non-zero 
demand for a different set of 5 of the 16 traded content products. The buyers (consumers) began 
each round by receiving their private demand schedule, which told them the products they needed to 
buy in the present round and what the products were worth to them. They did not know about the 
other consumers’ demand schedules or about the producers’ cost figures. However, they could see 
ask prices of products currently available in the market, enter new bids into the system at any time, 
and get instant feedback when they completed transactions. Each buyer received a different set of 
five products that had different valuations. The allocation of products and willingness-to-pay values 
changed for consumers from round to round. Buyers monitored the market for available products and 
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In Appendix B, we present some sample trading screen shots and discuss in greater detail the 
information with which producers (sellers) and consumers (buyers) were working to make their 
decisions in the experiment.  
5.8. Experimental Participants 
We recruited a total of 224 participants from the undergraduate student population at a large public 
university in the United States and randomly grouped them into 16 cohorts of 14, which included four 
producers and 10 consumers each. We repeated each treatment four times, and each session used a 
different cohort of participants. We did not find any significant differences among the cohorts in terms 
of gender, age, GPA, computer efficacy, or study major. We did not allow subjects to participate in 
more than one session. After the volunteering subjects came to the experimental laboratory, we 
randomly assigned them to the roles of a producer or a consumer and seated them at separated, 
individual workstations that served as trading terminals for selling or buying content products in the 
market. We did not allow subjects to communicate with each other during the experiment other than 
posting the bids and asks in the trading periods. We paid the subjects a USD$10 show-up fee and a 
performance-based payoff that averaged about USD$25 and ranged from USD$0 to USD$75. The 
payoffs were based directly on experimental profits. The system updated and showed participants’ 
earnings to them after each completed transaction and trading period to provide them with instant 
feedback on the trading decisions they made in the experiment.  
5.9. Experimental Procedures 
We asked the subjects to read a set of instructions (included in Appendix C) that explained the market 
rules and the use of the trading system that we developed for the experiment. The instructions 
explained to the participants how they could generate profits in the experiment and how they would get 
paid in real cash dollars. We then quizzed the participants to ensure had a basic understanding of the 
experiment’s rules. The subjects participated in a preliminary practice round that lasted 10 minutes. 
They could ask questions about the user interface and the trading rules during the practice session. We 
discarded the data from the practice rounds and did not use it for analysis. We then conducted 10 more 
rounds of the experimental market for each cohort. We randomly determined the length of each round to 
last anywhere between five and six minutes with equal probability, which we did to remove the explosive 
activity that typically occurs when the closing time is known during the last seconds before the market is 
closed (Roth & Ockenfels, 2002). We recorded the times resulting from the random draws during the 
first session of the experiment and used them in all following sessions. Thus, we ran the same number 
of rounds with the same length under all treatments (i.e., for all cohorts).  
6.  Measurements 
We measured market performance with three variables over all rounds and sessions of the 
experiment—product variety (PV), total consumer surplus (TCS), and total producer surplus (TPS)—
and compared these variables across treatments.  
 
Product variety counts the number of unique products, of the 16 possible products, that consumers 
actually acquired in each round. Among the 16 products in the experimental economy, 11 were 
theoretically profitable to varying degrees for producers, and 5 were not 12 . Depending on the 
decisions the participants made, different market outcomes were possible. In any round, any product 
could be provided by a producer and bought by some consumers, provided but not sold to consumers, 













1  (average number of unique products acquired by 
consumers per round) 
12 Available industry data indicate that the return on investment in major music or movie productions is highly uncertain and that 
many of them lose money (e.g., Davidson, 2012; Thomson, 2012). 
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(number of unique products acquired by 
consumers in round r of session s) 
r = round 1, 2, …, R;  R = 10  
s = session 1,2, …, S;  S = 4 
k = product 1,2,..,K;  K = 16  
 Dk : dummy variable; 1 if product k is sold to consumers, 0 otherwise. 
 
The individual consumer surplus (CS) of each round depended on how many products consumers 
were able to get and how much they paid for them. If a consumer had a value v for a product and 
bought that product at price p, then the consumer’s profit on the product was v – p. The consumer’s 
surplus CS for a round was the sum of the profits of all five of the consumer’s products. The TCS of 
the round was the sum of all ten consumers’ individual consumer surpluses. The same calculation is 
performed for every round and over all four sessions.  
 
 (average total consumer surplus per round) 
 
(surplus for consumer i in round r of session s) 
Vin : valuation for product n of consumer i (see Appendix A) 
Pin : transaction price for product n of consumer i 
i = consumer 1,2,…,  I; I = 10 
r = round 1, 2, …, R;  R = 10  
s = session 1,2, …, S;  S = 4 
n = product 1,2,…N;  N = 5  
Bin: dummy variable; 1 if consumer i bought product n in the market, 0 otherwise. 
 
The profit a producer earned at the end of a round depended on the number of copies sold for each 
product and on the price points at which the sales were made. We calculated the individual producer 
surplus (PS) by adding up the prices of all sold copies minus all fixed costs incurred in the production 
process. The possibility existed for producers that their revenues did not recoup their production costs. 
In such a case, the round ended with a loss for the producer. The total producer surplus (TPS) was 
the sum of the profits of all four producers in a round. We repeated the same process for each round 
in each session.  
 
 (average total producer surplus per round) 
 
(surplus for producer j in round r of session s) 
Sjm:  sales of product m of producer  j 
Cjm:  production cost of product m of producer j (c.f. Appendix A) 
j = producer 1,2,..,J;  J = 4  
m = product 1,2,…M;  M = 4  
Djm: dummy variable; 1 if producer j developed and offered product m, 0 otherwise 
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7. Results 
Each of the 4 treatments obtained 40 observations (4 separate sessions with 10 rounds each), which 
resulted in a total of 160 observations for the study. We used the Shapiro-Wilk test to examine the 
sample data for normality, and, based on the results, we concluded that the data came from a 
normally distributed population. However, we did find some inter-cohort variability. Applying Levene’s 
test indicated a difference between the variances of consumer surplus and producer surplus in our 
treatments. Therefore, we used Welch-type adjustments in the following ANOVA tests to handle the 
unequal variances (Welch, 1947).  
 
To minimize potential effects of repeated experimental rounds, we rotated the ten consumer demand 
schedules between each round so that each subject received a different demand schedule (with 
different product assignments and willingness-to-pay parameters). Furthermore, to account for 
potential round effects, we conducted the repeated measures ANOVA test to obtain a better estimate 
of the treatment effects. Experimental rounds showed no significant effect on the respective tests of 
product variety, consumer surplus, and producer surplus at the significance level of 0.05.  
7.1. General Interaction of Consumer Co-creation and Consumer Sharing 
To use separate ANOVA tests to explore possible interaction effects on our three individual dependent 
variables, we must first show that an interaction occurs in the general model. Thus, we first examine 
the general interaction effect of consumer co-creation and consumer sharing on product variety, 
consumer surplus, and producer surplus. Because we wanted to find out whether the three 
dependent variables taken together are affected by an interaction of consumer co-creation and 
consumer sharing, we employed a multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) test to examine WH1. Our results 
show that the three dependent variables had low to moderate correlation (less than 0.7), meaning 
that the MANOVA test was suitable for analyzing our data set. As Table 2 shows, both consumer co-
creation and consumer sharing did have a strongly significant interaction effect on product variety, 
consumer surplus, and producer surplus13. Hence, using separate ANOVA analyses to explore the 
specific interaction effects was appropriate. 
 
Table 2. General Interaction Effect  
Between subjects factors F (Pillai) df p-value 
Consumer sharing 12.793 153 <0.001 
Consumer co-creation 43.958 153 <0.001 
Consumer sharing * Consumer co-creation 39.748 153 <0.001 
  
7.2. Interaction Effect on Product Variety 
As Table 3 shows, both consumer co-creation and consumer sharing had positive significant effects 
on product variety. As effect size indicates, consumer sharing explained about 50 percent of the 
variance of product variety between treatments after excluding the variance explained by other 





13 As expected from previous findings in the literature, we also found significant main effects. 
14 However, it is difficult to interpret the main effects by themselves because their effect really depends on the level of the other, 
interdependent variable if significant interaction effects were present. Hence, the literature recommends focusing on interpreting 
the (significant) interaction effects. (e.g., Carte & Russel, 2003).  
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Table 3. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA Test for Product Variety 
Between-subjects factors F p-value Effect size (partial eta2) 
Consumer sharing 9.120 0.014 0.503 
Consumer co-creation 4.914 0.028 0.339 
Consumer sharing * consumer co-creation 140.138 <0.001 0.940 
 
More interesting, however, was the strong interaction effects (p < 0.001) of consumer co-creation and 
consumer sharing on product variety. It explained 94 percent of the variance of product variety 
between treatments after excluding variance explained by other predictors. As Figure 4 shows, 
introducing consumer co-creation affected product variety differently in the market settings that 
allowed and did not allow consumer sharing. When consumer sharing was present, the effect of co-
creation on product variety was stronger than when consumer sharing was not present. In the market 
that disallowed consumer sharing, consumer co-creation increased product variety from an average 
of 7.3 units to 10.2 units—an increase of about 40 percent. Consumers took advantage of the co-
creation option and self-made some products that they could not otherwise get. Among the 10.2 units, 
4.4 units were generated from consumer co-creation, which accounted for 43 percent of product 
variety. When consumer sharing was present, the increase was stronger, raising product variety from 
7.4 to 11.9 units—about a 60 percent increase. Having access to the sharing market, consumers 
were able to source more components that they could reuse to make some additional products 
themselves. Among the 11.9 units, 6.2 units were generated by consumer co-creation, which 





Figure 4. Mean Product Variety Across Treatments 
7.3. Interaction Effect on Consumer Surplus 
Next, we examine consumer surplus to explore how the interaction of consumer co-creation and 
consumer sharing affected the consumers in the market. 
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Table 4. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA for Consumer Surplus 
Between-subjects factors F p-value Effect size (partial eta2) 
Consumer sharing 21.437 0.001 0.704 
Consumer co-creation 48.045 <0.001 0.842 
Consumer sharing * consumer co-creation 13.942 0.005 0.608 
 
Both consumer co-creation and consumer sharing had a significant positive effect on consumer 
surplus (see Table 4). Consumer sharing explained about 70 percent of the variance of consumer 
surplus between treatments after excluding variance explained by other predictors, while the 
respective percentage of variance explained by consumer co-creation was about 84 percent. 
 
In addition, we found a significant interaction effect between consumer sharing and co-creation with 
respect to total consumer surplus, and this interaction explained 61 percent of the variance of 
consumer surplus between treatments after excluding variance explained by other predictors. When 
consumer sharing was present, the effect of co-creation on consumer surplus was stronger than 
when consumer sharing was not present. We found a stronger association between consumer co-
creation and total consumer surplus when we allowed consumer sharing (p = 0.005). Consumers 
were able to take advantage of the sharing market to more effectively apply co-creation, to self-make 
products that generated additional consumer value, and to obtain value by getting products that had 
not been available. Hence, they acquired not only more diverse products but also more valuable 
products. As Figure 5 shows, in the market without consumer sharing, consumer co-creation 
increased total consumer surplus from an average of 1840.9 to 2708.0—an increase of about 47 
percent. When consumer sharing was present, the increase was even more pronounced, raising total 




Figure 5. Mean Total Consumer Surplus Across Treatments 
 
As Table 5 shows, by co-creating products that previously were too expensive or not available in the 
market, consumer co-creation increased the (total) satisfied consumer demand by about 50 percent 
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(p<0.001). However, total consumer purchases showed a different pattern. Although total sales 
increased by 11.5 percent (from 1732.4 to 1932.3) when consumer sharing was absent, they fell by 
1.8 percent (from 1302.0 to 1278.3) when consumer sharing was present. In other words, when 
consumer sharing was considered, consumers sourced components from the illegitimate sharing 
market, which depressed legitimate sales. 
  








No 3164.3 (1308.5) 3342.0 (1046.4) 





No 1732.4 (606.1) 1302.0 (486.4) 
Yes 1932.3 (1013.8) 1278.3 (501.0) 
7.4. Interaction Effect on Producer Surplus 
 
Table 6. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA for Total Producer Surplus 
Between-subjects factors F p-value Effect size (partial eta2) 
Consumer sharing 37.430 <0.001 0.806 
Consumer co-creation 3.255 0.105 0.266 
Consumer sharing * consumer co-creation 15.370 0.004 0.631 
 
From Table 6, we can see that consumer sharing had a significant negative effect on producer surplus, 
and it explained about 81 percent of the variance of producer surplus between treatments after 
excluding variance explained by other predictors. However, the effect of consumer co-creation was 
not significant and only explained about 27 percent of the variance in producer surplus.  
 
In examining the interaction between consumer sharing and consumer co-creation, we found that 
consumer co-creation and consumer sharing showed a strong interaction effect (p<0.001) on 
producer surplus, and the interaction explained about 63 percent of the variance of producer surplus 
between treatments after excluding the variance explained by other predictors. Introducing consumer 
co-creation affected producer surplus differently in the market settings that included and didn’t include 
consumer sharing. As such, when consumer sharing was present, the effect of co-creation on 
producer surplus was weaker than when consumer sharing was not present. As Figure 6 shows, in 
the market that disallowed consumer sharing, consumer co-creation increased producer surplus 
(reduces losses) from an average of -638.8 to -85.4—a significant increase (p= < 0.001). However, 
when consumer sharing was present, the change was not significant (p = 0.853). Producer surplus 
actually decreased slightly from -732.7 to -839.2, which resulted from the significant reduction of 
consumer purchases (see Table 5 in Section 7.3). In non-co-creation settings, producers incurred a 
sales loss only from consumers who substituted shared copies for the purchase of legitimate copies. 
Apparently, producers suffered additional losses when both co-creation and sharing existed and 
interactively affected producers’ sales. In addition to the loss from shared copies, producers also 
suffered some losses when consumers substituted self-made products for purchases using the co-
creation capability. Hence, producer benefits from co-creation appear to be contingent on low 
consumer sharing levels, which may be difficult to control in real market environments.  
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Figure 6. Mean Total Producer Surplus Across Treatments 
 
Lang et al. (2009) suggest that co-creation increases total welfare and benefit both consumers and 
producers. However, our results qualify these previous findings by showing that consumer sharing 
and consumer co-creation has a significant interaction effect on producer surplus.  
7.5. Additional Analysis 
In this section, we present some additional analysis of our experimental data beyond the four 
research questions we formulate in Section 3.3.  
 
First, we look at total surplus to see how the interaction of consumer co-creation and consumer 
sharing influenced the market as a whole. In general, the market performed better with consumer co-
creation than when the market prohibits co-creation (see Table 7). 
 
From a business perspective, understanding the market environment and how to design co-creation 
mechanisms that are beneficial to the firm is important because it can effectively mitigate the risk of 
revenue loss from consumer sharing. In comparison with the baseline, producers allowing consumers 
to engage in content co-creation were able to charge higher prices on mainstream products (p-
value<0.01), and consumers significantly increased the amount of their purchases of mainstream 
products (p < 0.01) (see Table 8). However, when consumer sharing occurred, producers lost their 
position as the only source of digital content as consumers illegitimately shared digital content among 
themselves. Consequently, the number of mainstream products sold significantly decreased from 18.2 
to 12.0, and revenue from selling them was dramatically down to 827.6 from 1481.5. Therefore, we 
suggest that the level of consumer sharing is a crucial environmental factor that producers should 
consider when they adopt co-creation business models. 
 
Interestingly, although sales were down, producer profits in the CySy treatment (co-creation/sharing) 
were not significantly (p = 0.853) different from the baseline, which suggests that producers were able 
within certain levels of consumer sharing to maintain their business profits. We explain this arguably 
surprising result by noting the fact that producers were able to charge higher prices for mainstream 
products when they allowed consumers to engage in content co-creation (with a significant increase 
in the average price of mainstream products from 55.0 to 75.1).  
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Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Total Surplus 




No 1184.3.3 (584.5) 1191.0 (581.3) 
Yes 2860.2 (1256.6) 2594.0 (1343.8) 
 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Mainstream Products  
 Consumer sharing 
No Yes 




No 55.0 (25.2) 59.9 (28.0) 
Yes 83.6 (44.4) 75.1 (32.0) 




No 717.3 (234.9) 458.3 (187.9) 
Yes 1481.5 (867.2) 827.6 (364.2) 




No 14.3 (5.2) 8.9 (3.9) 
Yes 18.2 (6.8) 12.0 (4.3) 
 
8. Conclusions  
In this paper, we explore the interactions between co-creation and sharing, both important activities 
that are actually occurring in the age of digital content. We designed an economic experiment to 
learn something about these interactions, and what we learned about them contributes to the 
literature in interesting ways.  
 
In fact, our study makes three contributions. First, it offers a new market design for digital content that 
supports consumer co-creation in the presence of consumer sharing, which we implemented and 
evaluated in a laboratory experiment. Second, the findings from our experimental evaluation have 
some theoretical implications. We found evidence for significant interactions between consumer co-
creation and sharing that have not been theorized in the extant co-creation and piracy literatures. 
Third, our study offers some implications for business practice in terms of designing sustainable 
digital content markets. 
 
Testing, refining, and extending existing theory and building new theory serve critical roles in 
information systems research. Critical to these processes is the recognition that multiple types of 
theory answer different sorts of questions. According to Gregor (2006), theory for prediction and 
explanation—theory used to identify and propose testable (causal) theoretical relationships to predict 
and explain real-world phenomena—is the predominant nature of theory in information systems 
research. But Gregor also discusses design theory as another theoretical approach—one that 
underlies a growing stream of design research in IS research, including our study.  
 
The main contribution of design science research is typically the proposed and desirably evaluated 
artifact itself rather than building or testing theory. For example, in our case, the contributed artifact is 
an electronic market design for a digital content market that includes a content reuse licensing 
scheme supporting consumer co-creation. However, design theoretical research can be informed by 
other classes of theory as well, says Gregor (2006), who notes that design theory and theory for 
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prediction and explanation, in particular, are strongly interrelated. For example, design modeling 
choices and design evaluation should be guided by theoretical insights when applicable.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, our experimental results provide a potential basis for theory 
development for the emerging field of co-creation (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007). We found 
significant interactions and strong effects between consumer sharing and co-creation. Consumer 
sharing interacted with consumer-based co-creation to increase product variety and consumer 
surplus while reducing producer benefits from co-creation; meanwhile, social welfare benefits were 
robust in the presence of low to moderate consumer sharing. Logical follow-ups to the current study 
could involve developing theory about co-creation that explicitly incorporates the interaction effects 
between co-creation and sharing, as our findings indicate, and specifying and testing formal research 
hypotheses in various settings using the principles found in the theory of prediction and explanation.  
 
In terms of business implications, our study offers some insights for commercial content providers. In 
content markets, including music and film, producers of niche products are quite often barely 
profitable. Although many possible niche products are not made available in the market (i.e., they 
never get produced) because they are not profitable to their producers, consumers through their co-
creation activities are able to create some of them by reusing digital content. Our results show that 
most of the gains in product variety in the two treatments that include co-creation treatments come 
from the increased number of niche products obtained through co-creation. Accepting the reality of a 
participatory culture in which consumers of digital content goods increasingly undertake co-creation 
activities, producers can still sustainably and profitably pursue strategies that allow consumers to 
access and modify the contents of the producers’ mainstream products under appropriate licensing 
settings. In the presence of a long-tail demand curve, profit-maximizing content producers can focus 
on producing mainstream products. And, by giving consumers content reuse rights, producers can 
indirectly generate profits from the long tail because some niche demand will transfer to mainstream 
products, which co-creators need as a source for input materials to make specialized derivatives. In 
other words, firms (content producers) can effectively respond to the change in the market 
environment (introduction of piracy) and offset lost sales (in quantity) by charging and getting higher 
prices for goods that consumers are permitted to use for component reuse purposes. This capacity 
suggests that firms can, in principle, redesign their business models and adopt reuse licensing 
without necessarily hurting their bottom line.  
 
Our findings also offer some empirical evidence to support recommendations for designing content 
production markets that legally support co-creation platforms; such markets are critical for innovation 
and economic growth in the digital economy. Hargreaves’ (2011) report, for example, makes just such 
a recommendation to the U.K. Government.) 
 
As with all experimental work, our study has several important limitations. All our findings are based 
on data generated from one specific experimental design. Obviously, we need to be very cautious 
about generalizing beyond our experimental economy. More research is necessary to further validate 
our findings. Experimental research that analyzes variations on market designs for cultural content 
goods is necessary if we are to fully understand the co-creation phenomenon that we observe in 
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Appendices 





Figure A-1. Consumer Demand for Product “boa” 
 
The mainstream products (“sit,” “boa,” and “end”) were demanded by all the consumers. Midrange 
and niche products made up a category of non-mainstream products. The midrange (specialized) 
products (“net”, “and”, and “bit”) exhibited some level of specialization and were demanded by only a 
specific consumer segment. Finally, ten niche products (“bad”, “bat”, “bee”, “bet”, “dad”, “one”, “sea”, 
“sin”, “sob”, and “ten”) were highly specialized and targeted only a single consumer in our experiment. 
 
Table A-1. Fixed Cost Schedule and Units Demanded for All 16 Products 
Product Cost Units  demanded 
Producer 





and 200 3 4 dad 100 1 4 
bad 370 1 2 end 200 10 2 
bit 490 3 3 one 100 1 2 
net 320 4 1 sea 200 1 4 
bat 400 1 1 sin 300 1 1 
bee 270 1 3 sit 420 10 4 
bet 490 1 1 sob 470 1 3 
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Appendix B: Additional Experimental Process Details 
 Figure B-1 shows an instance of a buyer screen in a particular round of the experiment. Buyers could 
see which products they needed and what they were worth to them; they could also see ask prices of 
products currently available in the market. They could enter new bids into the system at any time. 
They also got instant feedback when they completed transactions and could monitor the cash dollar 





Figure B-1. Buyer Screen (Partial View) 
 
During the experiment, producers worked with a trading screen (see Figure B-2). Producers could 
see the fixed production cost of the products they controlled and could monitor bids as they are 
posted in the market. When they decided to produce a product and post an ask price and, thus, make 
it available in the market, the information was broadcasted to buyers. Producer decisions were 
entered into the trading system interactively through several specifically designed information fields 
and action buttons (not shown in the figure). The profits of the current round and the accumulated 
total profits over all completed rounds were shown to the subject in both experimental currency and 
real cash dollars. These data again provided participants with instant and real economic feedback on 
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions for Participants15 
A. Instructions for Consumers (Baseline) 
General Overview of the Game 
The purpose of this exercise is to study consumer decision-making in an electronic marketplace. You 
will be presented with a group of products. Each product has a specific value to you, and this value 
will be revealed to you. During each round you will try to acquire each of the products for the best 
(lowest) possible price. Your goal is to generate as much profit as possible, which is equal to the sum 
of the value of each product minus the amount you pay for it. Each purchasing round will last 
approximately five minutes.  
 
There will be one practice round, followed by a number of “real” rounds. The total time for the entire 
exercise will be approximately one hour. The sellers of each product have enough copies in inventory 
to satisfy any potential demand. Each product traded is symbolically represented by a three-letter 
word.  
The Rules 
Once you made a bid, you are only allowed to raise your bid, not to decrease it. You cannot submit a 
bid that is greater than the revealed value of the product. You can submit a bid at any time during the 
round. You do not have to wait until the product is available to submit a bid. If you have a question, 
please call one of the lab assistants. The seller has multiple copies of each product and can continue 
to lower the price to attract other buyers. 
Making Money 
The profit you earn from a transaction is equal to the value of the product minus the price you pay for 
it. For example, if the product “cue” has a value of $140 and you pay $90, you will earn a profit of 
$140 - $90 = $50. The profit you earn for each round is equal to the values of all the products you 
bought minus the total price you paid for them. For example, if you purchased the following products, 
with their values in parenthesis—arm($40), cue($140), den($60), kit(85), and mit($280)—for $30, 
$130, $50, $75, and $250, respectively, you will earn a profit of: ($40+$140+$60+$85+$280) – ($30 + 
$130 + $50 + $75 + $250) = $70.  Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all your round 
profits. 
Key Summary Points 
Your goal is to make money. The asking prices you see may remain the same or drift downward, but 
they never go up. Keep a close watch on the clock, especially as it counts down to the end of a round. 
If you have any questions, please ask one of the assistants. 
B. Instruction for Producers (Baseline) 
General Overview 
The purpose of this exercise is to study consumer decision-making in an electronic marketplace. You 
will be presented with four products that you may produce and offer in the market. Each product may 
have varying levels of demand in the marketplace. You have the option to build none, some, or all of 
these products. Each product has a specific fixed production cost, which will be revealed to you. 
During each round, you will try to sell copies of all products that you have made and brought to 
market for the best possible price.  
 
Each trading round will last approximately five minutes. There will be one practice round followed by a 
number of “real” rounds. The total time for the entire exercise will be approximately 1 hour. The 
products traded on the market are represented by three-letter words. 
15 Because of space constraints, we include the instructions only for the baseline treatment. The instructions for the other treatments 
are similar and are available on request from the authors.  
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The Rules 
Once you make a product and offer it in the market, you are only allowed to lower your ask price, not 
raise it. You can choose to produce a product at any time during the round. You can submit an ask 
price for the product at any time during the round. You do not have to wait until the demand for the 
product is indicated by seeing bids in the marketplace. You do not have to make and offer all your 
products. If you have a question, please call one of the lab assistants. The highest number of 
potential buyers in the marketplace is ten. The buyer values for individual products range from $0 to 
$300. 
Making Money 
The profit you earn from a transaction is equal to the price the buyers pay for the product minus your 
fixed production costs. For example, if you made the product, “and,” for $200 and sold 2 copies to two 
buyers for $100 each and an additional copy to another buyer for $50, your profit will be ($100 + 100 
+ $50) - $200 = $50. The profit you earn in each round is equal to the total sales made minus the total 
costs of producing your products. Your total game profit will be equal to the sum of all your round 
profits 
Key Summary Points 
Your goal is to make money. Not all products may be profitable. The bid prices you see will typically 
drift upward, but never downward. You can make money if you learn which products are profitable 
and what the best prices are that you can get from each product. Keep a close watch on the 
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